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NOTES
THE TEST OF "EMPLOYMENT" UNDER THE STATE
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACTS
An oil refining company consigned petroleum products to
the operator of a bulk station. The company filed a bill in
equity asking for a declaration that the consignee was not its
employee within the meaning of the state unemployment compensation act.'
This presents a problem already faced by
several courts, and since all of the states have passed unemployment compensation statutes to conform to the provisions of
the Federal Social S'eeurity Act, the question will probably arise
with increasing frequency. They have been asked to decide
what test should be used to determine whether a particular
person is so related to another as to be within the meaning of
"covered employment" under the provisions of the enacted
law. Obviously, the problem is one of statutory interpretation 2
which in this case is a matter of determining the test intended
by the legislature. In construing an unemployment compensation act, in order to find the true intention of the legislature,
the following fundamental propositions are believed to be paramount: (1) the statute should be studied as a whole and not
as a series of isolated clauses; (2) it should be construed with
reference to its intended purpose; and (3) since the legislature
has recognized an interest never before secured by the law,
the enactment should be considered in the light of modern social
and economic ideals and policies.
:Barnes v. Indian Refinery Co., 280 Ky. 811, 134 S.W. (2d) 620
(1939). The Kentucky Court of Appeals construed that act (Ky. Stat.
Baldwin's 1939 Supp. sec. 4748g-1-22) to apply only where the relationship of master and servant existed between the individuals, and concluded from the facts that the operator was an independent contractor.
2
It is urged that the excellent article by Prof. Powell, Construction
of Written Instruments, 25 A.B.A.J. 185 (1939) be read at this point
before considering the problem here presented. Other valuable articles
on the subject of interpretation of statutes are: Landis, Statutes and
the Sources of Law (1934) Harvard Legal Essays, 213; Davies, The
Interpretation of Status in the Light of Their Policy by the English
Courts (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 519; de Sloovere, Contextual Interpretation of Statutes (1936) 5 Fordham L. Rev. 219; de Sloovere, Extrinsic
Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes (1940) 88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 527.

NOTES

THE PURPOSE OF Tnn STATUTE

The theory that the courts should refer to the purpose of
an act to find the meaning of the legislature's language was
developed in early English law and was accepted by such great
writers as Blackstone, Coke and Powden. 3 This principle has
been followed in the United States,4 and effect should be given
to the purpose of the statute unless the result would amount
to doing violence to its provisions. 5 In many instances the
legislators have not expressly stated the purpose of the enacted
law, but most of the state unemployment compensation acts contain a declaration of policy to be used "as a guide for the interpretation and application" of the act.6 From this declaration
2Davies,

supra n. 2 at 520-522.
4Harco Corp. v. Martin, 271 Ky. 572, 112 S.W. (2d) 693 (1938):
Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws
(2d ed. 1911) 66-80; Powell (1939) 25 A.B.A.J. 185, 187-190; de
Sloovere (1936) 5 Fordham L. Rev. 219, 237; note (1937) 23 Va. L.
Rev. 725, 726. See also Haggar v. Helvering, - U.S. -, 60 Sup. Ct.
337, 339, 84 L. ed. 287, 289 (1940); Wildharber v. Lunkenheimer, 128
Ky. 344, 349, 108 S.W. 327, 329 (1908); Hodge v. Bryan, 149 Ky. 110,
112, 148 S.W. 21, 22 (1912).
r"The Legislature has the power to decide what the policy of the
law shall be, and if it has intimated its will, however indirectly, that
will should be recognized and obeyed. The major premise of the conclusion expressed in a statute, the change of policy that induces the
enactment, may not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate discharge of duty, for courts to say: We see what you are driving at, but
you have not said it, therefore we shall go on as before." Johnson v.
United States, 163 Fed. 30, 32 (1908).
a The declaration of policy contained in Kentucky's Act is typical:
Ky. Statutes, (Baldwin's 1939 Supp.) sec. 4748g-2. "Declaration of
state policy.-As a guide to the interpretation and application of this
Act, the public policy of this State is declared to be as follo~"s:
Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to
the health, morals and welfare of the people of this state. Involuntary
unemployment is therefore a subject of general interest and concern
which requires appropriate action by the General Assembly to prevent
its spread and to lighten its burden which now so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family. The achievement of social security requires protection against this greatest hazard
of our economic life. This can be accomplished by encouraging employers to provide more stable employment and by the systematic
accumulation of funds during periods of employment to furnish benefits
for periods of unemployment, thus maintaining purchasing power and
limiting the serious social consequences of poor relief assistance. The
General Assembly, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment
the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of this State
require the enactment of this measure, under the police power and
other reserved powers of this state, for the compulsory setting aside of
unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own. This Act is enacted as a part of
a national plan of unemployment compensation and social security."
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it appears that the primary purpose is to prevent the occurrence of the evils which accompany unemployment. This is
to be accomplished by encouraging employers to provide more
stable employment, and by systematically creating a fund for
the benefit of those who may become unemployed. The act
is to aid not only the individual who may find himself without
work, but is intended to increase the economic security of the
general public. 7 Since the unemployment compensation laws
were adopted as a part of a national policy, the general purpose
of Congress in passing the Federal statute becomes a part of
the policy of each state's enactment. Referring to its objective
Mr. Justice Cardozo in holding the Social Security Act constitutional, said:
"The parens pltrias has many reasons-fiscal and economic as well
as social and moral-for planning to mitigate disasters that bring these
burdens in their train."8

Considering the expressed purpose, independent of the
remaining provisions, the test of employment intended by the
legislature would seem to be in the nature of the following:
Whether the relation of the individual to his employer is of
such a character that the cumulative effect of its termination
induced by inexorable economic factors could reasonably be
expected to create the conditions against which the statute
was directed, place any great hardship on the individual and
would create a serious burden on the social and economic life
of the general public? Thus, the legislature has established
its basic test of "employment" and any apparent limitations
found in the act must be considered with a reference to that
basic criterion. It should clearly appear that a provision was
intended to narrow the test before such a construction is placed
upon it. It is significant that the decisions limiting the scope
of "covered employment" to common law "servants" contain
no discussion of the purpose of the unemployment compensa7Great Western Mushroom Co. v. Industrial Comm., 103 Colo. 39,

82 P.(2d) 751, 752 (1938): Industrial Comm. v. Northwestern Mut. L.
Ins. Co,, - Colo. -, 88 P. (24) 560, 562 (1939); Susquehanna Collieries
Co, v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., - Pa. Super. -, 8 A. (2d) 445, 446
(1939); McDermott v. State, - Wash. -, 82 P. (2d) 568, 574 (1938);

Note (1987) 16 ore, 14. Rev, 385, $87.
1 Steward Machiue Co. v.Davio, 302 U.S. 548, 587, 57 Sup, Ct. 883,
81 L.ed. 1279, 1201, (1937). See Cardoo'Qs discussion of the background
and purpose of the Social Security Act in 301 U.S. 548, 586-589, 81 L.
ed. 1279, 1290-1292 (1987),
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tic.n acts,9 while most of the cases in which a broader meaning
is given to "covered employment" refer to the purpose of the
statute.1 0
Tim

STATUTES RECOGNIZE A NEW INTEREST

Unemployment compensation is a radical advance in social
legislation. The legislatures have granted protection to an
interest which the common law ignored."1 That interest is
social in nature and inures to all members of society. All classes
of persons, from the lowest-paid laborer to the wealthiest capitalist, have an economic and social interest in preventing the
occurrence of the evils of unemployment for none escape its
consequences. It is the duty of the court then, in interpreting
a statute which acknowledges a previously unsecured claim,
to regard the standards of the society that called for its recognition. The North Carolina Court in Unemployment Compensation Commission v. Jefferson Std. Life Ins. C0.12 refused
to apply the narrow common law master-and-servant test of
employment, but felt impelled to construe the provisions of
the statute to conform with the present day conditions which
produced the enactment. The courts should, avoid falling victim
to a suspicion, so often characteristic of the legal profession,
that anything new is undesirable. Nothing is to be gained by
the importation of medieval concepts, which may have their
Barnes v. Indian Refining Co,, 280 Ky. 811, 134 S.W. (2d) 620
(1939); Texas Co. v. Wheeless, - Miss, -- 187 So. 880 (1939); Ameri187 So. 889 (1939); Wisconsin
can 0il Co. v. Wheeless, - Miss, Bridge & Iron Co. v. Ramsey, - Wis. -, 290 N.W. 199 (1940), In
Washington Recorder Publishing Co. v. Ernst, - Wash. -, 91 P, (24)

718, 722 (1939) the court said the act was passed as a part of the Federal Social Security Act but males no further comment on the purpose
of that plan. The court in Northwestern Mutual L, Ins. Co, v. Tgne,
125 Conn. 183. 4 A. (2d) 640 (1939) seems to have been justified in
using the independent contractor test since tbe statute in that state
expressly provided that "employment" meant service performed under
any contract of hire cxeating the relationship of master and servant.
11See for example Unemployment Compensation Comm. v. Jefterson
Std. Life Ins. Co., 215 N.C. 479 2 S.E, (2d) 584 (1939).
' Landis, supra n. 2 at 226.
215 N. C. 479, 2 S. E. (24) 584 (1939). See also Great Western

Mshroom Ce, v. Industrial Comm,, 103 Colo. 39, 82 P. (2d) 751, 752
(1939); Susquehanna Collieriea Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd, - Pa.
Super. -, 8 A. (2d) 445, 446 (1939); Landis, supra n. 2 at 222-223;
Powell, (1939) 25 A.BA.J., 185, 188; de S19overe, (1936) 5 Fordham
L. Rev. 219, 221, 238; (1940) 88 U. of Pa. L. Rev, 527, 551, 552.
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place in certain branches of the law, into a law which is a
product of an entirely different world. 13
The common law concept of master and servant is based
upon the fiction that "the act of the servant is the act of the
master." This fiction was used'in torts in order to make the
master liable for the servant's negligence.14 Originally the
theory related only to slaves, but once the formula was created
it was soon extended to make the master liable for the acts of
his free servants. Even attorneys and factors were treated as
"servants. ' ' 15 It was eventually recognized as a mater of common sense that an employer should not be liable for the acts of
all persons employed by him, and the result was the doctrine
of "independent contractor."' 6 This theory did not create a
new legal status but only served as a limitation on ex delicto
liability.
The fictional concept of master and servant can serve no
useful purpose in aleviating the evils of unemployment.' 7 For
example, consider the facts in the case of Wisconsin Bridge and
Iron Co. v. Ramsey.'s The X company was engaged in manufacturing and erecting iron works. Y was employed by them to
Should Y become unemployed,
superintend construction.
through no fault of his own, the hardship placed upon
him and the burden on society would be the same regardless of
whether or not he was an "independent contractor." Unless
the legislature has expressly limited the scope of the application of the unemployment compnesation law to the "master
See Helvering v. Hallock. - U.S. -, 60 Supp. Ct. 445, 84 L. ed.
382 (1939). Disregarding stare decisis, the court refused to apply the
technical common law definitions of terms used in real property law in
interpreting a statute relating to the gross estate tax. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in commenting on Klein v. United States, (283 U.S. 231,
51 Sup. Ct. 398, 75 L. ed. 996 (1931)) said: "It refused to subordinate
the plain purposes of a modern fiscal measure to the wholly unrelated
origins of the recondite learning of ancient property law." Helvering
v. Hallock, supra 60 Sup. Ct. at 448, 84 L. ed. at 385.
.' See Holmes, Collected Legal Papers (1920) 58, 59, 62-68; Pound,
The Interpretation of Legal History (1923) 109-111; Seavey, Speculations as to Respondeat Superior (1934) Harvard Legal Essays 433.
Is See Holmes, op. cit. supra n. 14 at 91, 92.
"See Holmes, op. cit. Supra n. 14 at 101-108, 114-115.
Utah -, 91 P.
'7 Globe Grain & Milling Co. v. Industrial Comm., (2d) 512, 514 (1939); Note (1938) 7- Brooklyn L. Rev. 480, 482.
(The court used the "indeWis. -,
290 N.W. 199 (1940).
1pendent contractor" test to exclude the person in question from the
operation of the statute.)

Noms
and servant" relationship there is no logical reason for the courts
to read such a limitation into the statute.
A glaring example of a failure to recognize the difference
between tort liability and the duty created in an "unemployment compensation statute is found in the case of Washington
Recorder Publishing Co. v. Ernst.19 Discussing the statutory
definition of "employment" Judge Millard said:
"Surely, the legislature did not intend to establish a different rule
than that which has heretofore been employed by this court. To hold
otherwise would be to, in effect eliminate the relationship of independent contractor. It would be a violent
presumption indeed to hold
that was the purpose of the legislature.' 0 (Italics added.)

Those words reveal an unfounded apprehension that the
elimination of the test of "master and servant" in unemployment insurance laws would affect liability in tort cases. The
court disregarded the fact that it was interpreting a statute relating entirely to a new field of law which has no relation to
vicarious liability. To illustrate, the X company might not
be liable for a tort of its salesman Y under the master-servant
test of liability but at the same time might well be obliged to
contribute to a state unemployment fund on the commissions
paid to Y.
Workmen's Compensation was a somewhat novel innovation in the law, and had behind it a policy in some respects
similar to the purpose of the unemployment compensation acts.
Steffen comments upon the interpretation of Workmen's Compensation Acts as follows:
. . . Moreover it is essential to determine upon the general
philosophical basis for the workmen's compensation laws, since, on
close questions it is the courts point of view in this regard which will
be determinative. A few courts have approached the statute as 'an act
In derogation of the common law' and 'to be strictly construed,' but
most courts . . . have adopted a liberal viewpoint.""
LIBERAL OR STRICT CONSTRUCTION

The Kentucky Unemployment Compensation Statute provides that it shall be liberally construed, 22 and that it is enacted
"under the police power and other reserved powers of this
1Wash.-,91 P. (2d) 718 (1939).
0
1d.
I at 91 P. (2d) 724.
1Steffen, Cases on the Law of Agency (1933) 178. See also City
of Milwaukee v. Miller, - Wis. -, 144 N.W. 188 (1913); 28 R.C.L.
Workmen's Compensation Acts, sec. 50-56.
22KY. Stat. (Baldwin's 1939 Supp.) sec. 4748g-21.
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state."

23

Nevertheless the court in Barnes v. Indian Refining
said that it was a taxing statute and therefore must be
strictly construed in favor of the person taxed. Two of the
cases cited by the court to support this view hold that the Federal Social Security Act is constitutional under the taxing power
of Congress. 25 The powers of Congress must be expressly or
impliedly delegated to it, while the states have all powers not
specifically denied to them nor delegated to the national government. Congress learned in the AAA case70 that federal
social and economic legislation might be a violation of the reserved powers of the states. So, in order to prevent constitutional objections the Social Security Act was enacted under the
taxing power of the Federal Government. It does not follow
that a state unemployment act is an exercise of the state's power
to tax, since the police power is within the state's sphere of
sovereignty. As a matter of fact, there may be some question
as to the constitutionality of the Kentucky act as a tax
measure.27 If it is a taxing statute any withdrawals from the
fund must comply with the requirements of Section 230 of the
Kentucky Constitution relating to appropriations. Such a difficulty would be avoided by recognizing the legislature's exercise
of its police power in the premises. All of the contributions
of employers and employees go into a trust fund for the benefit
of the unemployed, ana it is difficult to visualize funds disposed
of in this manner as being "revenue" of the state. 28
One court that used the master-servant test said that the
unemployment compensation statutes are not to be construed
Co.

'

24

Ky. Stat. (Baldwin's 1939 Supp.) sec. 4748g-2.
2280 Ky. 811, 813, 134 S.W. (2d) 620 (1939). See also Texas
Co. v. Wheeless, - Miss. -, 187 So. 880, 888 (1939).
The two cases are Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 57

Sup. Ct. 883, 81 L. ed. 1279 (1937), and Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S.
619, 57 Sup. Ct. 904, 81 L. ed. 1307 (1937).
v. Wheeless. -

Miss. -,

187 So. 880 (1939).

The third case is Texas Co.

,,United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 80 L. ed. 477,
(1936).
21For a discussion of the constitutionality of state unemployment
compensation laws see Notes (1938) 32 Ill. L. Rev. 704; (1937) 35 Mich.
L. Rev. 1306; (1937) 16 Ore. L. Rev. 385.
28
In Carmichail v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 57 Sup.
Ct. 868, 81 L. ed. 1245, (1937) the Act of Alabama was held valid under
the state's power to tax, but the language of the court in the second
part of the opinion (301 U.S. at 514-518) which is captioned by the
court "Validity of the Tax as Determined by its Purposes" sounds very
much like the "police power" of the state.

NOTES
as changing the common law unless the purpose to effect such
change is clearly expressed therein, and to have such effect the
language must be clear, unambiguous, and peremptory.29 This
seems to be but another way of stating the old canon that
statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed. The value of the distinction between "strict" and
"liberal" construction has been questioned,30 but if "liberal
construction" means that a common-sense interpretation is to
be made with a reference to the purpose and background of the
statute, then unemployment compensation acts should be
liberally construed. To say that such statutes are to be strictly
construed is to say that little effort is to be made to give effect
to the intentions of the legislature.
TYPIcAL

STATUTES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION

The test of "employment" within the meaning of the Social
Security Act has been determined in two instances by Federal
District Courts. 3 1 In both cases it was found that under Regulation 91 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue the individual in
question was not an "employee" but an "independent contractor". The federal act defines employment as "any service,
of whatever nature, performed within the United States by an
employee for his employer ... "32 The act contains no definition
of "employee" or "employer" but it is submitted that the purpose and history of the statute should be referred to in determining the test of employment. Since the regulations of the
Bureau seem to indicate that the administrators of the Social
Security Act have attempted to apply the master-servant test
of employment, it may be that an amendment will be necessary
to reconcile the inconsistencies that have resulted from the use
"Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Ramsey, - Wis. -, 290 N.W. 199,
202 (1940).
"de Sloovere, (1936) 5 Fordham L. Rev. 219, 222-223; (1940) 88 U.
of Pa. L. Rev. 527, 528.
"1Indian Refining Co. v. Dallman, 31 F. Supp. 455 (S.D. Ill. 1940)
(Same contributor who objected to paying under the state act in Barnes
v. Indian Refining Co., supra n. 1); Texas Co. v. Higgins, 32 F. Supp.
428 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). Both cases seem to use the same test of employ
ment as is ordinarily used in cases holding the master liable for torts
of his servant, though in the Texas Co. case it was agreed before trial
that the definition of employment should not be so limited.
22 42 U.S.C.A. sec. 1011.
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of the common law test.33 State courts have held that the
rulings of the Bureau of Internal Revenue are not conclusive
upon them, and that the state statute must be construed according to the legislative intent disclosed by it. 3 4 There seems to be
nothing to prevent a state legislature from making its laws more
inclusive than the Social Security Act, if constitutional rights
are not invaded.
The typical state unemployment statute35 contains a section
that defines the terms as used in the act. These terms may include "wages", "services", ''employing unit", "employment"
employer",
and
"subject
or
"covered
employment",
"employee". The legislature is its own lexicographer and may
give its own meaning to terms which have another technical meaning in the common law.3 6 In a Kentucky case a statute requiring petitioners to be "freeholders" was satisfied by stating that
the signers were "citizens, landowners, legal voters and taxpayers" though under the common law definition this might not
have been sufficient. 37

The Restatement of Agency says:

"Statutory use of Servant. Statutes have been passed in which
the words 'servant' and 'agent' have been used. The meaning of these
words in statutes varies. The context and purpose of the particular
statute controls the meaning which is frequently not that which the
same word bears in the Restatement of the Subject." (Italics added.)"

Moreover, the definitions that are included in the glossaries of
the various statutes are not to be isolated and construed sepa39
rately, but they must be read in connection with the entire act.
"Eugene T. McQuade, The Unemployment Relationship Under the
Federal Social Security Act, (1939) 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 480, 487. See
also Notes (1940) 44 Dick. L. Rev. 162; (1938) 23 Va. L. Rev. 725;
(1939) 23 Minn. L. Rev. 848.
31Industrial Comm. v. Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co., - Colo. 88 P. (2d) 560, 566 (1939); Park Floral Co. v. Industrial Comm., 104
Colo. 350, 91 P. (2d) 492, 495-6 (1939); Capital Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v.
Kansas Comm. of Labor & Industry, 148 Kan. 446, 83 P. (2d) 106, 108
(1938); Unemployment Compensation Comm. v. Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co., -

N.C. -, 2 S.E. (2d) 592, 597 (1939).

"For the various state statutes see the Commerce Clearing House,
Inc., Unemployment Insurance Service.
"Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 55 Sup. Ct. 333, 75 L. ed.
780 (1935).
31Pendleton v. Letcher Co. Fiscal Court, 194 Ky. 688, 240 S.W. 358
(1922). See also Payne v. Fiscal Court, 200 Ky. 41, 252 S.W. 127
(1923).
"Section 220; comment, subsection (1), (d).
9 Black, op. cit. supra n. 4 at 317-321; Powell, supra n. 2 at 186; de
Sloovere, (1936) 5 Fordham L. Rev. 219, 226-227. See Vincennes Bridge
Co. v. Guinn's Guardian, 231 Ky. 772, 22 S.W. (2d) 300 (1939).

NoTEs
A clause, or phrase, or even a section might appear to have but
one plain meaning when read alone, but would be ambiguous
or have an entirely different meaning when considered in the
40
light of the purpose and history of the whole statute.
The New York Act defines "employment" as "any employment under any contract of hire-including all contracts entered
into by helpers and assistants of employees whether paid by
employer or employee . . ."41 This phrase seems more inclusive than the master and servant relationship, especially when
considered with the entire act. However, the courts of the
Appellate Division have applied the "independent contractor"
test to determine whether persons were employees within the
meaning of the statute.4 2 The case of Andrews v. Commodore
Knitting Mills, Inc., 43 is interesting in that the court used definitions of terms found in an earlier labor statute44 and disregarded
the glossary within the unemployment compensation act. In
none of the cases did it appear to have been urged that a broader
test than that of the master-and-servant relationship was intended by the legislature, and the highest court of the state has
not passed on the question.
Mississippi's statute4 5 defines "wages" as all remuneration
payable for personal services, including commissions and
bonuses. "Employment" means service performed for wages
or under any contract of hire-. The statute was construed by
the Mlississippi Court 4 6 to exclude "independent contractors",
but the statutory definitions, seem to have been ignored, and the
court isolated the terms "contract of hire" and "employer" and
ascribed to them their common law meanings.
41See Powell, supra n. 2 at 189, de Sloovere, (1940) U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 527, 553.
" Thompson's Laws of New Fork (1939), Labor Law, see. 500 et seq.
41Andrews v. Commodore Knitting Mills, Inc., 13 N.Y.S. (2d) 577
(1939); In re Scatola, 14 N.Y.S. (2d) 55 (1939); Andrews v. North
Shore Country Club, 16 N.Y.S. (2d) 863 (1940) Caddies were held to be
within the provisions of the act and no mention was made of the
independent contractor test); Levine v. Alumnium Cooking Utensil
Co., Inc., 17 N.Y.S. (2d) 434 (1940).
"13 N.Y.S. (2d) 577 (1939)
"Thompson's Laws of New York (1939), Labor Law, sees. 2 and
350.
,Miss. Laws 1936 c. 176, amended by Laws 1936 (1st ex. ses.) c. 3
amended by Laws c. 147.
'Texas Co. v. Wheeless, - Miss. -, 187 So. 880 (1939). See also

American Oil Co. v. Wheeless, -

K. L. J.-7

Miss. -,

187 So. 889 (1939).
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A number of states have adopted a statute containing a
definition of employment similar to the following:
"Employment" subject to the other provisions of this subsection,
performed for wages or under any contract or
means service .
hire . ..
Services performed by an individual for wages shall be deemed to
be employment subject to this act unless and until it Is shown to the
satisfaction of the Commission that(A) such individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over the performance of such services, both under his
contract of service and in fact; and
(B) such service is either outside the usual course of the business
for which such service is performed or that such service Is performed
outside of all the places of business of the enterprise for which such
service is performed; and
(C) such individual is customarily engaged in an Independently
established trade, occupation, profession, or business."
"Wages" is usually defined as "all remuneration payable for personal services including commissions and bonuses."'1

Some of the courts in applying a statute containing these "three
point exemptions" have refused to use the common law masterand-servant test to determine whether a person is within the
meaning of "employment". 48 Those courts have considered
the purpose of the enactment, and have read the definitions with
reference to the whole act, realizing they were dealing with a
newly created interest. As Chief Justice Rosenberry pointed out
in his dissenting opinion in Wisconsin Bridge and Iron Co. v.
Ramsay,49 the definition of each of the terms defined in the act,
such as "employer", "employment", etc., contains the other
OThe provisions here are taken from the Colorado Act, S.L. 1936
(3rd ex. sess.) p. 13 c. 2, 1935 C.S.A. 1937 Supp. c. 167A.
1939). IndusI In re Mid American Co., 31 F. Supp. 601 (S. D. Ill.,
trial Comm. v. Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co., - Colo. -, 88 P. (2d)
,560 (1939); (In the case of Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm.,
- Colo.-, 95 P. (2d) 4 (1939) the court said it was controlled by the
Northwestern Mutual Ins. Co. case, but that the commission might have
reasonably found that the agents of the company were employees even
.under the common law master-and-servant tests); Unemployment Compensation Comm. v. Jefferson Std. L. Ins. Co., 215 N.C. 479, 2 S.E. (2d)
584 (1939); Globe Grain & Milling Co. v. Industrial Comm., - Utah
- 91 P. (2d) 512 (1939) (Rehearing denied in 97 P. (2d) 582 (1939);
McDermott v. State, - Wash.-, 82 P. (2d) 568 (1938) (Apparently

overruled in Washington Recorder Publishing Co. v. Ernst, - Wash.
-,
91 P. (2d) 718 (1939). See Maine Unemployment Compensation
Comm. v. Maine Savings Bank, - Me. -, 3 A. (2d) 897 (1939), (Building contractors who had repaired certain buildings owned by the bank
were held not to be covered by the act under an exemption in sec. 19(e)
of the statute which defined "Employing unit." No mention was made
of the test of "independent contractor" but it is submitted that the
exemption was not applicable).
4'- Wis. -, 290 N.W. 199, 206 (1940).

NOTES

defined terms. Since those terms are cognates, in order to find
the meaning of any one of them it is necessary to refer to the
entire glossary.
Other courts have treated the "three point exemption"
statute as nothing more than a recital of the ordinary tests used
to determine whether an individual is a common law "servant.' ' 5 In some instances the courts seem to have consciously
ignored the statutory definitions5 1 and proceeded to use the
common law test of master and servant.
The glossary5 2 in the Kentucky Unemployment Compensation Act defines "wages" as all remuneration payable for services, 5 3 including commissions and bonuses. "Services" shall not
include odd-jobs and subsidiary work. "Employing unit" and
"subject employer" are also defined. "Covered employment"
means service, performed for wages or under any contract of
hire, written or oral, express or implied in which the relationship of the individual performing such service and the employing unit for which such services are rendered, is as to those
services, the legal relationship of employer and employee. In
its construction of the act the court took the phrase "the legal
relationship of employer and employee" to be the key to the
determination of what persons were covered by its provisions,
and concluded that the phrase "means what it says and that
the words are synonymous with the legal concept of master and
servant". It is significant that the terms "master and servant"
5 Washington Recorder Publishing Co. v. Ernst, - Wash. -, 91 P.
(2d) 718 (1939); Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Ransay, - Wis. -,
290 N.W. 199 (1940). See the dissenting opinion in Unemployment
Compensation Comm. v. Jefferson Std. L. Ins. Co., 215 N.C. 479, 2 S.E.
(2d) 584, 590 (1939). In Buckstaff Bath House Co. v. McKinley, Ark. -, 127 S.W. (2d) 802 (1939) (Affirmed in 60 Sup. Ct. 279, 84 L. ed.
242 (1939)) the individuals were held "employees" and not "independent contractors" but the question as to whether the act excluded
"independent contractors" was not discussed.
Note, 124 A.L.R. 682.
See Washington Recorder Publishing Co. v. Ernst, - Wash. -91 P. (2d) 718, 724 (1939); Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Ramsey,
-

Wis. -,

290 N.W. 199, 202 (1940).

Ky. Stat. (Baldwin's 1939 Supp.) sec. 4748g-3.
In the original act (Ky. Acts, 1936, 4th ex. ses. c. 7, p. 100, see.
19) "wages" was defined as all remuneration for personal services
ord., but in the 1939 Act (Ky. Acts 1939 c. 50 p. 301, sec. 3-g) the
word "personal" does not appear. This would seem to indicate an
intention of the legislature to broaden the scope of the act, but the
court in Barnes v. Indian Refining Co., 280 Ky. 811, 134 S.W. (2d) 620
(1939) said the omission of the word was without significance.

KENTUCK

LAW JOURNAiJ

and "independent contractor" do not appear in the statute. It
is true that the phrase used by the legislature is treated in some
tort cases as being synonymous with "master and servant", but
it is submitted that had the court considered the act as a whole,
with reference to the declared purpose of the legislature it
could not have said that the plain meaning of "legal relation
of employer and employee" was the "common law concept of
master and servant."
Connecticut's statute5 4 does not contain a declaration of
policy and defines "employment" as "any service . . . performed under any express or implied contract of hire creating
the relationship of master and servant. No definition of the
master and servant relationship appears in the statute and the
court in Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. (o. v. Tone 55 applied
the common law "independent contractor" test. The legislature
seems to have indicated its intention that the scope of unemployment compensation should be limited to common law servants.
An examination of the cases as a group discloses that the
conclusions reached by the different courts do not depend so
much upon the form of the statute as upon the attitude the particular court adopted toward the unemployment compensation
law. Those courts which considered the expressed policy of the
act, and realized that it applied to a new field in the law, gave
effect to that policy in construing the provisions of the statute.
The courts which did not adopt such an approach found terms
within the statute to which they could attach entirely unrelated
common law connotations and limited the coverage of the statute
to "servants". The result reached by the first group is a broad
application of the act according to its policy and terms. The
second group only partially recognizes a claim of society that
the legislature intended to secure.
If the common law concept is not to be used to determine
who are "employees", it may be asked "what is to be the test?" 50
The Kentucky Court seemed to be troubled with that problem
when it said:
Any other construction would lead us into the purest speculation
uninvited by the plain terms of the Act itself. We will not seek to
Conn. Gen. Stat. 1937 Supp., sec. 803d et seq.
51125 Conn. 183, 4 A. (2d) 640 (1939).
5 See the dissenting opinion in Globe Grain & Milling Co. v. Industrial Comm., -

Utah -,

91 P. (2d) 512, 517 (1939).

NoTEs
read indefiniteness into that which is definite or vagueness into that
which Is clear.""

The answer is that a line does not have to be precisely drawn
nor in terms of concepts known to legal phraseology. The statute
contains its own glossary and defines the relationship that must
exist before new rights and duties, created by the enacted law,
will be enforceable. The task given the courts by the legislature
is not easy. But the judicial branch should not avoid a duty
merely because it is difficult. The courts must now do what they
have been doing since the beginning of the common law. By the
process of inclusion and exclusion as the cases are presented
it will be determined on which side of the line, drawn by the
statutory test of employment, particular persons or classes or
persons will fall.5 8 This very method was used by the courts
m the law of negligence in determining the persons who were
included under the formula of "master and servant" so as to
make the master liable for the servant's acts. Since Unemployment Compensation law is in its infancy in this country, more
definite lines cannot be drawn.
R. VINcENT GooDLnTT

17280 Ky. 811, 816, 134 S.W. (2d) 620, (1939)
"Globe Grain & Milling Co. v. Industrial Comm., - Utah -, 97
P. (2d) 582 (1939) (Denial of a petition for rehearing. See also the
dissenting opinion of Rosenberry, C.S. in Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co.
v. Ransay, - Wis. -, 290 N.W. 199, 205-208 (1940). For a discussion
of the relation between the courts and the state commissions in adjudicating unemployment compensation disputes see Pennock, Unemplojment Compensation and JudicialReview (1939) 88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 137.

